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Legislation  recently  introduced  by  Congressnan  Stephen  Neal  would
mandate  that  prlce  stability  receive  the  highest  priority  among  the  goals  of
the  Federal  Reserve,l  Because  of  the  renewed  policy  interest  in  price
stability,  the  potential  costs  and  beneflts  of  achieving  it  have  attracted.
much  attention.2  One of  the  more  irnportant  benefits  attributed  to  price
stability  is  that  it  vrould  lessen  the  uncertainty  associated  rrith  the  price
level  and  the  detrimental  effects  this  uncertainuy  can  hawe  on  long-term
contracting  and  resource  allocation  (Ha1l  1981,  Black  1990,  parry  1-990,
Hoskins  1-991, surnrners  1-991).  Proponents  of  price  stability  argue  that  because
money  is  an  interternporal  store  of  va1ue,  an  unceltain  price  level  causes
people  to  devote  resources  to  protecting  thenselves  against  potentlal  declines
in  the  walue  of  money.  Therefore,  the  ellnination  of  price  level  uncertainty
r,rould allolr  a  rnore efficient  alfocation  of  resources.  A  second  possible
benefit  from  price  stability  is  a  reduction  in  the  discretion  afford.ed
policymakers  in  setting  monetary  policy.  proponents  argue  that  if  price
stability  Ls  a  central  bank's  primary  responsibiLity,  then  uhis  goal  would
reduce  policymakers'  pursuit  of  other  discretionary  goals.  The costs  of
achieving  price  stability  are  prinarily  associated  \^,ith  the  short-rerm
adjustment  costs  of  moving  from  the  current  inflationary  regine  to  the  price
stability  regime,  such  as  the  output  lost  when  actual  inflation  is  less  than
antic  ipated  .
While  the  sutrj  ec!  of  price  stabitity  has  received  nuch  attention,  there
has  been  relatively  little  discussion  about  specific  monetary  policies  that
House  of  Representatives
See Aiyagari  (  f990,  1991)
Joint  Resolution  409.
and Hoskins (f99f).
1would  enable  a  central  bank  to  achieve  and  maintain  price  stability  or  the
degree  to  which  price  stability  would  conflicr  wirh  oEher  policy  objectlves.
Therefore,  rather  than  add  to  the  debate  about  the  costs  and  benefits  of  price
stability,  in  this  paper  we  investlgate  the  conditions  under  which  monetary
policy  would  ensure.price  stability  and  exarnine  the  effectiweness  of  a  broad
class  of  monetary  rules  in  achieving  price  stability.  l.le also  examine  whether
price  stability  constralns  the  monecary  pollcy  authorities,  pursuit  of  short-
run  stabilization  objectives.  Throughouc  the  paper,  the  focus  is  on  the
restrictions  that  price  stability  imposes  on  the  conduct  of  nonetary  policy,
rather  chan  on  the  desirability  or  optinaLity  of  price  stabiLity.
Unfortunately,  a  precise  definition  of  price  stability  has  not  ernerged
fron  recent  literature,  Fortunately,  howewer,  aL1  adwocates  and  opponents  of
price  stability  appear  to  have  either  one  of  two  types  of  definitions  in  mind;
soue  form  of  targeting  the  price  level,  which  we refer  to  as  strong  price
stability  (SPS),  or  sorne forn  of  targeting  inflation  aX zeyo  (or  at  least  at  a
very  low  rate),  which  we refer  to  as  vreak price  stability  (l^IpS).  In  order  to
nake  our  analysis  of  price  stabiltty  concrete,  we propose  forrnal  definitions
for  both  of  these  versions  of  price  stability.  At  a  mininum,  strong  price
stabiLity  requires  that  the  price  Level  be  a  stationary  stochastic  process
while  weak price  stability  requires  that  inflation  be  a  sttationary  stochastic
process.  As  r,re show  be1ow,  chese  definitions  irnply  quite  different  long-run
behavior  of  prices.
For  each  definition  of  price  stability,  we outline  the  long-run
restrictions  on  the  behavior  of  the  monetary  aggregales  needed  to  achieve
price  stabillty  and  demonstrate  conditions  under  which  specific  monetary  rules
are  consistent  i,/i th  price  stability.  The  monetary  rules  examined  includenonetaly  aggregate  tarteting,  nominal  cNP targeting,  price  level  targeting,
and  interest  rate  targetlng.  We show thaL  the  monetary  aggregate  restrictions
associated  with  SPS are  much  rnore  powerful  than  those  associated  with  I^IPS.  In
facu,  implernentlng  I47PS  would  not  necessafily  require  any  changes  in  the
stalionarity  properties  of  the  price  level  or  the  monecary  aggregaces,  For
SPS,  we  shorrr that  targeting  the  priee  level  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  noninal
CNP are  rnore likely  to  be  consistent  with  strong  price  stability  than  is
targeting  monetary  aggregates  or  interest  rates.
In  addition,  \de use  a  simple  ltnear  rational  expectations  macro  nodel  to
expLore  how  Ehe conditions  for  price  stability  rnay constrain  other  monetary
policy  objectives.  We find  Chat  the  conditions  for  SpS and  WpS impose  few
constraints  on  the  abllity  of  the  monetary  authorities  Eo pursue  short-run
stabilization  objectives.  Intuirively,  this  result  follor*rs  from  the  fact  that
the  conditions  for  price  stability  are  of  a  long-run  nature  whiLe
scabilization  objectives  are  of  a  short-run  nature.
The  distlnction  between  short-  and  long-runs  also  raises  the  question  of
what  is  the  relevant  time  horizon  for  evaluating  the  performance  of  policies
that  satisfy  the  alternative  definitions  of  price  stability.  We shor,r that  the
nain  difference  between  WPS and  SPS is  that  the  latter  results  in  a  reduction
of  long-terrn  uncertainty  about  the  price  levef.  In  fact,  advocates  of  SpS
cite  this  attribute  of  SPS as  the  Tnain reason  for  pursuint  it.  In  our
definitions  of  price  stability,  however,  the  reLevant  tine  horizon  is
essentially  tnfinity.  Shorter  horizons  may be  more  relevant  for  business
planning  horizons  over  which  the  benefits  of  reduced  price  level  uncertainty
are  likely  to  accrue.  We find  that  while  SpS helps  co  reduce  price  level
uncertainty  at  shorter  tirne  horizons.  it  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  forninimizing  price  level  uncertainty.  For  longer  time  horlzons,  SPS is  a
necessary  condition  for  minimizing  price  level  uncertainty.
The paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  second  section  defines  and
discusses  the  characteristics  of  strong  and  weak price  stability.  Section
three  outlines  Lhe  restrictions  on  the  nonetary  aggregates  that  are  consistent
with  our  definitions  of  price  stability  and  section  four  evaluates  speclfic
monetary  rules  for  their  ability  to  achieve  prlce  stsability.  In  section  five,
a  nacro  rnodel  is  introduced  to  examine  ruhether  achieving  price  stability
precludes  the  pursuit  of  short-run  stabilization  policies.  Section  fiwe  also
exarnines  the  connections  between  strong  price  stability  and  price  leve1
uncerlainty  at  horizons  less  than  infinity.  Conclusions  and  discussion
follow.
II.  Defining  Price  Stability
Before  we exarnlne the  implications  of  price  stability  for  monetary
policy,  we must be more precise  about  the  possible  interpretations  of  the  tern
"price  stability.  ''  A careful  reading  of  the  literature  indicates  that  the
different  interpretations  of  price  stability  fa1l  into  two groups.  One
ernphasizes  that  price  stabllity  requires  the  long-run  level  of  prices  be
targeted  (sPS) [e.g.,  Black (1990), Gavin and Srockman  (f988),  Hetzel  (L990),
Hoskins  (1991),  and Parry  (1990)1,  while  the  other  ernphasizes  that  price
stability  entails  targeting  only  the  inflation  rate  (ltps)  [e.g,  Corrigar,
(f990),  McCallun (1990b), Neumann  (1991), and Sunners  (1991)1.3
Under  SPS, the  monetary  authorities  ensure  that  the  price  level  is
described  by  a stochastic  process  of  the  form:
'  Not  all  the  WPS  advocates  supDort  a  "zero',  tarseted  inflation  rate.(1)  pt  -  p*  +  Epr
where  p"  is  the  targeted  long-run  value  of  the  price  level  and  €pt  ls  a  mean
zero  stationary  stochastic  process,  Because  €pt is  a  mean zero  stationary
stochasti-c  process,  p"  is  the  unconditional  nean  or  long-run  average  value  of
the  price  lewel  under  strong  price  stability.  The  inportant  characteristic  of
pursuing  this  target  is  that  the  price  level  will  not  display  drift.
Depending  on  the  specifics  of  the  price  stability  mandate,  gaps  betlireen  pt  and
p"  will  eventually  be  closed.
Under  I^IPS, che  monetary  authorities  essentiall-y  pursue  an  inflation
target.  This  yields  an  inflation  process  of  the  forrn
(2)  Ft  :  p+  €nt.
rthere  p  is  the  inflauion  target  ower  a  given  time  interval  and  e,..  is  a  nean
zero  stationary  stochastic  process.  For  the  remainder  of  the  paper  we
consider  the  zero  inflation  target  (that  is,  set  p  equal  xo  zero).  Because
there  are  no  other  restrictions  on  er..,  weak price  stability  neans  that  while
inflation  wiII  be  a  stalionary  stochastic  process  the  (Iog)  price  level  itself
nay  be  a  nonstationary  or  integrated  process.  Thj-s  is  clearly  seen  for  the
case  where  err. is  white  nolse.  In  this  case,  inflation  is  white  noise  but  the
price  level  is  a  random walk.  Price  Ievel  drift  occurs  because,  I^.IPS  by
targeting  the  inflation  rate  fails  to  reverse  shocks  Lo  the  price  level.
Under  a  poLicy  that  targets  inflation,  the  monetary  authorities  take  the  price
Ievef  as  tiven  at  the  beginning  of  each  period  and  then  attenpt  to  achieve  the
target  inflation  rate.  They  do  not  attempt  to  reverse  shocks  that  occur  to
the  price  level  because  of  monetary  control  errors  and  rnacroeconornic  shocks
that  drive  a  wedge  betrn'een  the  actual  and  targeted  inflation  rates.
Note that  under both  definitions  of  price  stability  uhe averageinflation  rate  or  unconditional  expectation  of  inflation,  E(a"),  is  zero.
However,  Iong-term  price  level  uncertainty  is  going  co  be  subsuantially
greater  under  weak price  stabllity  than  under  strong  price  stabiLlty.  In
contrast  to  the  constant  variance  of  the  price  lewel  rule,  the  uncertainty
associated  with  -1ong*1gn  forecasts  of  the  price  level  under  the  zero  inflation
rate  rule  grows  linearly  with  the  forecast  horizon.s  This  difference  arises
beeause  unexpected  changes  in  the  price  level  under  an  inflation  rule  are
permanent.  After  a  shock,  the  monetary  authorities  are  interested  only  in
achieving  zero  inflation  frorn  that  line  hence;  they  do  not  offset  the  price
shock.  Therefore,  there  is  substantialLy  more  long-term  uncertainty  about  the
price  level  under  the  inflation  rule  than  under  the  price  Level  rule.  The
short-term  uncertainty  depends  on  the  structure  of  the  economy,  the
information  available  to  the  nonecary  authority,  and  the  sources  of  shocks  to
the  economy.  As  r,re show  below,  in  general  ,  there  are  no  clear  predictions
about  which  Eype  of  rule  would  generate  the  nost  short-term  uncertalnty.
The  perceived  additional  reduction  in  long-run  uncertainty  gained  frorn  a
price  lewel  rule  is  one  of  the  main  issues  that  divides  those  L'ho  argue  for
a  However,  in  any  given  period,  strong  price  scability  does  not  irnply
that  inflation  should  be  equal  Xo  zero.
5  To  illustraue  that  the  price  level  rule  results  in  less  long-rur.
uncertainty,  let  E(p.** lI.)  be  the  optirnal  forecast  of  pr+k,  giwen  the
information  set  at  time  I  F^*  ^^^^  .'L^*^  -  -nd  €,Tr  are  white-noise  errors,
under  weak price  stabili;r  o;;;"'i:;"i"li]  iLtl".e  of  k-horizon  price  leve1
forecast  is
war[p.*s  -  E(pt+r<  lI.)  ]  :  o2"k  ,
while  for  scrong  price  stability  the  variance  of  k-horizon  price  level
forecast  is
var[pt+k  -  E(pt+rl].)]  -  o2p.
The  assurnption  of  rahite-noise  eirors  is  not  crucial  ,  We could  assune  Ehat  €pr
- 
+(L)ept  and  e,..:  a"r(L)e,..,  where  €pt and  €nt are  stationary  stochastic
processes.  The  conparison  of  long-run  volatility  is  not  substantially  chauged
by  this  nore  general  assrxnption  about  the  €'s.the  SPS (e.9.  Hoskins  1991)  and  those  who  argue  for  WPS (e.g.  McCaIIurn 1"990b)
Advocates  of  WPS do  not  view  the  additional  reduction  in  long-run  uncertainty
as  substantlal  relative  to  the  gain  fron  reducing  average  inflation  to  zeto.
The  advocates  of  SPS,  on  the  other  hand,  see  this  benefit  as  one  of  the  main
reasons  for  pursuing  price  stability.
IIL  Price  Stabllity  and  Monetar_v  Policv
This  section  examines  the  restrictions  that  the  al-ternatlve
defini.tions  of  price  stability  irnpose on  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.
Strong  price  stability  requires  that  the  long-run  Level  of  prices  fluctuate
around  a  particular  level;  ln  other  words,  the  price  level  is  a  statlonary
stochastic  prosess,  The  requirement  that  prices  be  s  tationary--meaning
that  prices  follow  an  integrated  process  of  order  zero,  I(0)--imposes  very
strong  restrictions  on  the  long-run  conduct  of  nonetary  policy.  Consider
the  simple  quantity  theory  reLaLionship  (in  logarithrns)6
(3)  pt:[t*vj-e1r
where  mt  is  a  particular  monetary  attre1aLe,  v.  is  velocity,  and  qt  is  real
GNP in  logarithms.  Strong  prlce  stability  requires  that  monetary  pollcy
must  be  conducted  in  such  a  way  that  [m. +  v.  -  qt]  is  I(0).
For  example,  in  order  to  achieve  strong  price  stabiliuy  vrhen vt  and  qt
are  integrated  of  order  1,  I(1),  monetary  policy  must  follow  a  feedback
ruLe  in  \,rhich  the  noney  supply,  velocity,  and  real  GNP are  cointegrated.
6  The basic  insighus  of  this  section  hold  for  more  general  rnodels  of  the
macroeconomy.  The  appendix  shows  in  a  standard  rational  expectations  macro
nodel  that  the  order  of  integralion  of  the  price  level  essentially  depends  on
the  order  of  integration  of  m.,  shocks  to  aggregate  supply,  and  shocks  to
aggregate  demand.  To  achieve  price  stability,  nonetary  policy  must  offset  alL
sources  of  nonstaLionarity  that  otherwise  affect  the  price  Level,An  example  of  such  a  feedback  rule  is:
(4)  rt:  -  Vt-1 +  qt-1 +  lI(0)1,
where  II(0)]  contains  other  cerxns that  are  I(0).7
Weak price  stability  requires  that  the  inflation  rate  be  I(0)  with
nean  zero.  To  achieve  weak price  stability  where  w.  and  qt  are  I(1),  the
nonetary  authority  need  only  set  mt  to  offset  the  deterministic  drift  j-n vt
-  q..  Aside  frorn  the  positive  mean,  U.S.  lnflatlon  slnce  1946 has  arguably
satisfied  lhe  conditions  for  weak price  stability.E  Thls  suggests  thac
aside  from  the  positive  dri.ft  in  prices,  current  nonetary  policy  is
consistent  \rith  our  definition  of  weak price  stability.
On the  face  of  ic,  the  restrictions  inposed  by  the  two  versions  of
price  stability  do not  appear  to  be  very  powerful;  yet,  they  can  rule  out
entire  classes  of  monetary  policies,  If  v.  or  qr  is  not  I(0),  then  under
strong  price  stability  the  rnoney supply  EgEl!  be  chosen  so  that  it  irill
offset  the  nonstationarity  of  velocity  and  output;  in  other  words,  the
actual  money  suppLy  must  follow  sorne sort  of  feedback  ru1e.e  In  the  long
run,  monetary  policy  must  offset  the  effects  of  permanent  shocks  to
'  Several  well-known  feedback  rules  have  the  same basic  form  as  equation
(6).  I,Ialsh  (1986)  examines  a  model  with  an  aggregate  supply  curve  and  a
quantity  theory  aggregate  dernand curver  as  well-  as  a  nominal  rnoney supply
equation.  Walsh's  optirnal  rnoney supply  equation  can  be  rewritten  so  that  it
has  the  same forrn  as  equation  (5).  Meltzer  (1987)  also  proposes  a  feedback
rule  that  is  similar  to  thar  ln  equarion  (6).
8  Schwert  (1987)  presents  arnbiguous  ewidence  on  whether  inflauion
foLlows  a  I(0)  or  I(1)  process  during  the  post-War  period.  For  the  gold
standard  period  of  l-870-1913,  Barsky  (1987)  shows  that  inflation  is  white
noise,
e  In  principle,  it  is  possible  that  nr  4  v.  -  q.  is  I(0)  regardless  of
the  behawior  of  the  money supply.  However,  rhis  possibility  is  highly
unlikely  at  a  theoretieal  level  because  it  requlres  veloclty,  output,  or  both
to  offset  the  behawior  of  the  money  supply.  Long-run  money  neutrality  of
oulput  rules  out  thls  Eype of  behavior.velocity  and  real  GNP.
fV.  Evaluating  Various  Monetary  Rules
This  section  examines  some well-known  monetary  rules  to  determine
whether  they  satisfy  the  conditions  for  strong  price  stabillty.  We first
consider  the  implications  of  price  stability  for  money  supply  targets.  We
then  consider  the  effects  of  target  cones  and  target  bands  on  the
feasibility  of  price  stabillty.  Finally,  we exarnine  several  feedback  rules
for  monetary  pol icy--  including  targeting  nominaL  cNP,  the  price  fevel,  and
interest  rates--and  deterrnine  under  what  conditlons  these  ruLes  ensure
Drice  stabilitv.
IV,1  Money supply  targets
Under  k-percent  growth  rules,  the  monetary  authority  attempts  to
control  noney  growth  so  that  it  increases  at  a  k-percent  annual  rate  in
each  tlrne  period,  implying  E(An.l1.-1)  -  k.  In  this  case,  actuaL  money
supply  growth  is  given  by
(5)  nt  -flt_r-ft+/t,
where  ry'. is  a  control  error  (r,rhich  is  presumabLy  a  suationary  stochastic
process,  typically  assumed to  be  white  noise),  Note  that  if  control  errors
are  not  offset,  the  money supply  exhibits  "base  drift,"  meaning  that
control  errors  have  a  perrnanent  effect  on  lhe  money  supply.  Here,  the
money  supply  is  an  I(1)  process  independent  of  the  behavior  of  v.  and  q..
This  type  of  rnonetary  rule  is  unlikely  to  meet  the  necessary  conditionfor  strong  price  stability.l0  Because mt for  the  k-percent  growUh rule  is
I(l)  regardless  of  the  behavior  of  v"  and  gt,  lrnt -  vr  +  qt]  is  unlikely  to
be  I(0)  and,  hence,  strong  price  stability  will  not  hold.!t  Hol'ever,  as
Long as  k  is  set  equal  to  the  deterministic  drift  in  9t  -  v  the  k-percent
growth  rule  will  satisfy  Ehe conditlons  for  weak price  stability.
In  principle,  target  bands  or  target  cones  can  force  the  monetary
authority  to  offset  control  errors;  the  money  supply  is  contracted  if  it
exceeds  the  band  and  is  expanded  if  it  is  beloru  the  band.  However,  the
current  method  of  specifying  target  cones  (in  addition  to  allowing  the
target  to  drift)  is  unlikely  to  yield  strong  price  stability.  The  reason
is  that  target  cones  are  not  a  particularly  binding  constrainc  on  the  money
supply  in  the  long  run.
For  example,  consider  the  case  in  which  the  money  supply  is  given  by  a
random  rrralk  lrith  drift--that  is,  an  on-average  k-percent  rule,  The
expected  value  of  the  future  rnoney supply  and  its  one  standard  deviation
confidence  band  are  given  by
(6)  E(rn.ll6)  t  SD *  mo +  kt  1  o$y'r,
where  mo is  the  initial  money  supply  level  and  ou  is  the  standard  dewiation
of  the  control  error.  Compare  this  \,rith  a  targeL  cone  of  the  forrn
(7)  rno  + kt  I  6r,
rlthere 6t  is  the  width  of  the  cone.  Regardless  of  the  size  of  the  cone  (6)
and  the  variance  of  control  error  (oj2),  eventually  uhe  target  cone  will
envelop  the  confidence  band  for  m..  This  characteristic  implies  that  a
r0  This  critique  of  base drift  has been mentioned by  several  auchors,
including  Poole  (1970).
11  OnIy  in  the  very  unlikely  case  in  which  vt  and  qt  automatically
offset  any permanenc change  in  the  noney  supply  will  prices  be  sLationary.
LOtarget  cone  is  not  a particularly  binding  constraint  in  the  Long run,  when
the  money supply  follows  a  random walk  with  drift.  Indeed,  a  target  cone
that  is  never  readjusted  is  insufficient  to  yield  strong  price  stability,
even if  velocity  and output  are  thenselves  I(0).  This  result  suggests  that
the  currenu  monetary  aggregate  targeting  procedure,  vrhich  combines  a  target
cone and base drift,  is  unlikely  to  produce strong  price  stability.
0n  the  other  hand,  a  target  band  of  the  form
(8)  mo+kt1r,
r.'here d  is  the  band width,  is  consistent  with  strong  price  stability  as
Iong  as  v.  and  q.  are  stationary.  A  tartet  band  of  the  forrn  given  in
equation  (8)  ensures  that  the  money suppLy  is  scationary  around  a
determiniscic  trend.  Provided k  is  chosen to  offset  che deterninistic
drift  in  qt  and vt,  the  noney  supply  will  satisfy  the  conditions  for  strong
price  stability,  Of course,  when vt  and q.  are nonstationary,  a  xar gex
band wlll  not  achieve  strong  price  stability.
IV.2  Nomlnal  cNP targets
Several  researchers  have  suggested  using  noninaL  GNP  targeting  as  an
intermediate target  for  monecary  poLicy  Ie.g.,  Ha1l (1983), Tobin (f983),
Gordon  (1985), Taylor  (1985), McCallurn  (1988, 1989, 1990a, 1990b)j.  The
notivation  for  this  type  of  targeting  is  that  it  avoids  many  of  the
problems  associated  with  nonetary  aggregaXe targeting,  such  as  veLocity
instability.
We shouLd mention  several  general  points  about  norninaL CNP  targeting.
First,  by  targeting  the  noninal  cNP growth  rate,  the  monetary  authority  can
only  be  sure  that  nominal CNP  (in  Logarithrns),  p. + 9t,  is  I(1);  there  is
l1no  ltay  of  ensuring  that  prices  are  stationary.  Thus,  to  achieve  strong
price  stability,  the  appropriate  nominal  cNP  target  EgS!  be  directed  at  the
1eve1  of  norninal  GNP.  0n  the  other  hand,  to  achieve  weak  price  stability,
the  nonetary  authority  need  only  target  nominal  cNP  growth.
Second,  if-  che  monetary  authority  targets  the  level  of  nominal  GNP,
the  attainment  of  slrong  price  stability  depends  on  the  behavior  of  oulput,
the  nominal  GNP target,  and  the  implled  real  GNP and  price  level  targets.
To  illustrate  this  point,  let  the  logarithrn  of  nomlnal  cNP be  given  by  x.  :
P.  +  9..  Consider  a  simplified  version  of  the  nominal  GNP  rule  considered
by  McCallum  (1988,  1989,  1990a,  1990b),12  in  which  the  money gronch  is
deternined  by  the  feedback  rule:
(9)  Amt :  -  Avt-r  +  Ax*r  -  l(x._r  -  x*.-r),
where  x*t  is  the  nominal  cNP  target  and  0  <.1  <  L.  Here,  the  rnoney supply
is  set  to  offset  past  deviations  of  nominal  GNP  frorn  irs  targeE.
Using  the  quantity  theory  reLationship  and  the  money  supply  equatlon
to  solve  for  prices  yields:
(10)  p.  *  L/ lL- (L-\)Ll  [A2vi +  Aq*.  -  Ag.  +  Ap*t  -  tr(q.-r  -  q*.-r)
+ trP*.-r L
lrhere  q*t  and  p*.  are  the  implied  targets  for  real  GNP and  the  price  1eveL,
respectively  (note:  x*.  -  q*.  +  p*.).13  For  strong  price  stability,  the
12  McCallum's nominal GNP  rule  looks  like
Am.  :  0.0075 -  (w.-r -  vr_a.)/'J,6  -  tr(x._r -  x*1_1),
where  the  money supply  is  the  nonetary  base,  che  time  index  represents
quarters,  and 0.0075 is  the  quarterly  growth rate  in  potential  or  target  real
GNP,  or  E(Aq*.;.
13  The solution  for  p.  given  above  ignores  the  complenentary  solution
inplied  by  uhe prlce  lewel  difference  equatlon.  To  get  the  general  solution
for  p.,  add the  term
(1-l)"  {po -  p* -  1,/[1-(1-l)L] [A2vo  + Aq*0  -  Aqo  + Ap*o  -  l(q_r -  q*_r) ]],
LZappropriate  price  Carget  is  a  constant--that  is,  p*t  -  p*.  Thus,  reducing
(  10)  yields
(11)  p.  -  p*  +  q*t  -  q.  +  [1/(  1-(1--I)L  )]  A2...
If  1>.1  > 0,  strong  price  stability  is  feasible  as  long  as velocity  is
I(2)  or  less  and  9*t  -  9r  is  I(0).  As  long  as  the  nominal  cNP target
(giwen  the  constant  prlce  target,  this  means  the  inplicit  real  GNP target,
q*t)  adjusts  so  that  9*t  -  9.  is  l(0),  rhen  the  price  level  will  be  an  I(0)
process.  Ttis  result  suggests  that  norninal  GNP targeting  ls  capable  of
achieving  strong  price  stability,  even  if  real  GNP is  nonstationary,  4_9
lonq  as  the  inplied  real  GNP target  takes  inco  account  this
nons tationarity  .
Hall  (l-983)  and  McCaLlum (1989)  suggest  selecting  a  once  and  for-all-
time  target  path  for  norninal  GNP.  Their  motivation  is  to  ensure  that  the
nominal  GNP  rule  is  credible.  Gordon  (1985)  and  Tobin  (1983)  suggest
periodically  reevaluating  the  noninal  CNP target  to  take  into  accounl
changes  in  potential  GNP.  This  debate  about  how  to  choose  the  nominal  GNP
target  is  not  a  trivial  natter  as  far  as  price  stability  is  concerned.  As
the  above  algebra  suggests,  the  method  of  choosing  the  GNP target  can  be
quite  imporuant  in  determining  rhe  feasibility  of  price  srabilicy.  OnIy
with  a  periodic  reevaluation  of  the  nominal  CNP target  can  nominal  GNP
targeting  ensure  sErong  price  stability  when real  GNP is  I(1).
IV. 3  Prlce  level  targets
where  the  po is  the  price  level  in  the  initial  time  period.
13Possible  problems  associated  wiLh  choosing  the  nominal  GNP  target  hawe
led  some Lo suggest  targeting  rhe  price  level  directly  (Barro  1986 and
McCallurn  1990b).  Indeed,  prlce  level  rules  appear to  be the  most direct
and flexible  monetary rules  for  achiewing  strong  price  stabllity.  For weak
price  stabllity,  some  sort  of  inflation  target  rule  must be euployed.
McCalLuu  (f990b)  suggests  a price  level  rule  of  the  forrn
(12)  An. -  Aq*t  -  Avr-1  + Aqr-r -  I(p._r  -  p*),
vhere  Aq*r  is  the  targeted  quarterly  real  GNP  growth  rate.  Solving
McCallurn's prlce  rule  yields
(13) p.:  p* +  [1/(L-(r-.r)L]  [Aq*, + A2v.  -  A2q.  ].
Therefore,  for  McCallum's rule  to  yield  price  stability,  w. and q. must be
I(2)  or  1ess.  Indeed,  any price  level  rule  that  includes  feedback terms
for  welocity  and real  cNP grolrth,  as  in  equation  (13),  will  yield  price
stabillty  if  velocity  and reaL GNP  are  I(2)  or  1ess.
IV.4  Interest  rate  targets
In  general  ,  interest  rate  targets  do  not  ensure  strong  price
stability.  coodfriend  (1987)  and VanHoose (1989)  have  shown that  the
desire  to  snooth  noninal  interest  rates  Leads  to  price  level
nonstat  ionar ity.  Hence,  interest  rate  targeting  tends  to  be  inconsistent
with  strong  price  stability.14
Recently,  Hetzel  (1990)  has  offered  an  interesting  proposal  in  which
14  Mccallun  (1990b)  has  sho'^m that  a  pure  interest  rate  peg  does  not
constitute  a  well-formulated  monetary  policy.  Some additional  specification
of  the  rnoney  supply  process  is  needed--for  example,  a  money  supply  rule.
However,  the  stochastic  process  for  prices  changes  depends  on  the  rnoney supply
rule  ewen  though  the  nominal  interest  rate  is  pegged.
L4the  government  issues  indexed  bonds  as well  as  noninal  bonds  and uses  the
spread  between  the  two  t)rpes  of  bonds  as  a  guide  for  nonetary  policy.  We
can  forroalize  his  proposal  as  a  sfunp1"e  expected  inflation  target,  oI
(14) m. -  rt_1  :  -d  [E(p.*11I.) -  nt],
where E(p.*.1I.)  is  uhe ratlonal  expectation  of  the  price  level  at  c +  L,
given  time  period  t  infornation.  Using  the  quantity  theory  equation,  we
can solve  for  the  inflation  raEe (assuming ldl  <  1):
(15) Ap. -.t^  (-d)t  E[(avt+r  -  Aq.*r)  lt.]. l:u
The presence  of  the  expectations  term  prevents  the  difference  operator  on
both  sides  from canceling  out.  Therefore,  the  price  Level  can be
nonstacionary  even  if  velocity  and real  GNP  are  stationary.  Thus,  the
Hetzel  interest  rate  target  is  not  likeLy  to  generate  scrong price
stability.  It  is,  however,  consistent  with  weak price  stability.  This  is
to  be expected since  Hetzel's  rule  can be used to  pursue a zero  inflation
tarset.
V.  Prlce  stabtll.tv  in  a  rnacroeconomic  nodel
V.1  Prlce  stability  and  short-run  stabilization  pollcy
While  strong  price  stability  imposes  strong  restrictions  on  uhe  long-
term  behavior  on  prices  and monetary  policy,  what  do  these  restrlctions
inply  for  short  tern  stabiLization  policy?  ln  general  ,  the  long-run
restrictions  implied  by  price  stabiLity  will  inpose  constraints  on  the
ability  of  the  monetary  authority  to  entate  in  short-term  stabilization.
However,  as  we  show below,  it  is  not  clear  that  these  constraints  are
particularly  binding.
15The  restrictions  that  strong  price  stability  iupose  on  short-cerm
stabilization  poLicy  depends  on  the  short  tern  dynamics  of  the  econony.  In
order  co  analyze  these  constraints  we  must  be  more  specific  about  the
economic  structure  than  in  the  previous  section.  ln  thls  regard,  lre
consider  a  simple  linear  rational  expectatl.ons  model  of  the  economy  giwen
by:
(16)  m. -  p.  :  -4oit  *  srgt  -  vt
(17)  q.  -  -  brl  i.  -  (.E p.*r  -  p.)  ]  *  e.
(18)  q.  -  q*.  +  cr(p.  -  r_1E  pt)  +  zt
I^there ao,  ar,  b1,  and  cl  are  positive  constants.  m.  is  the  (1og)  rnoney
supply,  pt  is  the  log  of  the  price  level,  qr  is  the  log  of  output,  it  is
the  nominal  interest  rate,  vt  is  a  shock  to  money  denand,  e.  is  a  shock  to
cornmodity  demand,  q*.  is  the  natural  or  trend  Ievel  of  output,  and  z.  is  a
supply  shock.  Equation  (L6)  is  a  sirnple  rnoney dernand  equacion,  (17)  is
commodity  demand equation  (IS  curve),  and  (18)  is  an  aggregate  supply
equation.
Substituting  and  rewriting  yields:
(19)  -ar  tE  pt+r  +  (l+a1+o2)pt  -  az .-rE  p.  -  Dt  *  v'.  -  o3(q*.+  z.),
vhere  c,  :  ao, 02:  cr(ar+ao/br)  ,  a3 -  a1+as/b1  ,  v,t  :  aoe./b,  +  v..15  Strong
price  stability  requires  lmt + v't  -  o:(9*.+  z.)]  be  I(0)  (see appendix).
This  condition  is  qualitatively  similar  to  the  condition  described  in  the
prewious  section  and,  hence,  may of  the  insights  of  uhe prewious  sectior-
will  carry  over  to  this  rnodel.  To  make  further  analysis  of  uhe  effect  of
price  stability  on  short  run  stabilization  policy  inueresting,  yet  keep  the
1s  We combine  the  noney  and  cornmodity
variable  for  notational  and  algebraic  ease.
not  alter  insitht  derived  frorn  the  analysis
demand  shocks  into  a  singLe  random
Separacing  the  t\do  shocks  would
be  1ow  .
I6algebra  tractable,  we  assume  that  q*.  and  v'.  are  given  by  q*t  -  g*.-r  *  eq.
and v't:  v't-r  *  evr,  where  e9. and  e'.  as  well  as  zr  are  white  nolse,
Suppose  that  the  monetary  policy  is  governed  by  the  following  reaction
function:
(20)  t\  -  do +  0.m.-, *  dzeqt -F drg*.-r  *  doe.. +  drv'.-,  +  06zt +  I(p*  -  p.-1).
Note  that  this  reaction  function  enconpasses  many  of  lhe  rules  describec
above.  For  exarnple,  if  0r:  L,  0z -  ds -  0,  and  .\ >  0  then  monetary  policy
is  following  a  price  level  target  slmilar  to  that  described  by  McCallurn
with  .\(p*  -  pt-r)  representing  the  error  correction  term.  If  l:0  as
well,  then  monetary  policy  would  be  consistent  with  the  expected  inflation
target  suggested  by  Hetzel.
Given  tha  monetary  reaction  funcuion  described  by  equation  (20),  the
equilibriun  price  process  has  the  forrn
(21)  p.  -  60 +  61mr  +  62ecE  +  6:9*._r  *  54e.t +  65v'r_r  +  662t.
The  6's  can  be  solved  for  by  the  method  of  undetermined  coefficients  and
are  presented  ln  the  appendix.  Using  the  moneCary  reaction  function  and
equation  (20),  r.'e can  rewrite  Che equilibrium  price  process  as
(22)  .ll(0r-\6r)Llpr  :  60(L-dr)  +  61do  +  6r.lp* 1  l6L0z +  62 -  drdtl.lec.
+  [61d3  +  5. -  63d1L]q*r_1  +  [61d4  +  6a -  5ad1L]e".
+  [6105  +  6'  -  65d1l]v',t-r *  *  16L06  +  66 -  6u0rL)2..
Recall  that  the  term  L  represents  a  lag  operator.
In  order  for  strong  price  stability  to  hold  (that  is,  prices  to  be
I(0)),  the  money supply  reaction  functlon  must  satisfy  the  following
restrictions:
(i)  [61d3  +  63 -  63d1]  :  0,
(ii)  [61ds  +  65 -  6sd1] :  0,  and
t7(iii)  ld1 -  16!l  <  1.
Using  the  walues  of  61,  63,  and  6,  (see  appendix),  the  first  two  conditions
can be  rewritten  as  (i')  03 -  ar(L-| r)  and  (ii')  05 -  -(L-0).  Note  that,
in  general,  the  presence  of  the  error  correction  term  (l)  is  neither  a
necessary  nor  sufficient  condition  for  price  stability.
Note  also  that  price  stability  places  no  restrictions  on  the  other
parameters  of  the  noney  supply  reaction  function,  in  parEi-cular  02,  0t,  and
06.  Yet,  these  parameters  are  typically  the  ones  nost  useful  for  shor!  run
stabilizaclon  policy.  For  example,  consider  the  monetary  authority  who
wanted  to  mlnimize  Var(q.-q*.;.  For  the  above  model ,
(23)  Var(q.-q*.)  :  I  c,  (62-61  0 
") 
l2Y  ar  (e<,) +  lc1(6a-61da  )  ]  2Var(e"t)
+  [c1  (66-61d6)+L]2\l  ar  (2.) .
One can  choose  ,2,  0a,  ard  d6 so  that  Var(q.-q*6)  :0  regardless  of  the
values  of  0y,  0r,  and d,  (see  appendix).  Thus,  in  thls  example  strong
price  stability  imposes  no  restrictions  r,.rhat-so-ever  on  short-Cerm
stabilization  policy.  In  fact,  even  if  we did  not  allow  the  monetary
authority  to  use  current  information  in  setting  its  noney  supply  rule  (i.e.
0z *  0q:  do -  0),  the  Var(q.-q*.)  can  still  be  set  equal  xo  zero  and price
stability  ho1d.  In  this  case,  d,  -  I/(1+or)  and  -(1+a1) (2ar+L) /a1  <  I  <  -
(L+ar) /ar.  This  rnoney  supply  ru1e,  even  though  it  cannot  directly  offset
current  period  shocks,  is  abLe  to  stabilize  output  by  noving  future  money
supply  in  teaction  to  che  shocks.16  This  in  turn,  causes  expectations  of
future  prices  to  change  and,  hence,  causes  conmodity  demand  to  move  to
offset  current  period  shocks.  fnterestingly,  in  this  case,  the  error
ro  We are  of  course  assuming  thac  the  monetary  authority  can  credibly
commit  to  its  state  contingent  rule.
1-8correction  tern  is  negative.  Note  that  a  price  level  target  similar  to
that  examlned  by  Mc0allum  (0,  -  L  and  0  (  I  <  1  r^rith  0z *  0q :  d6 :  0)  whlle
achiewlng  price  stability  does  not  rnlnlml-ze the  Var(qr-q*t).  Perhaps  this
is  why  the  price  level  targel  in  McCallum's  analysis  is  less  effeccive  than
other  types  of  rdles  (speclfically  norninal  gNP targeting)  at  stabilizing
real  GNP.
U.2  Prlce  stabllity  and  prlce  level  uncertainty
While  the  definition  of  strong  price  stability  proposed  above  has  the
advantage  of  an  being  an  unarnbiguous  mathenatical  or  algebraic  definition
of  price  stabillty,  it  is  not  necessarily  a  definition  that  captures  the
economic  essence  of  \dhaL sorne people  consider  to  be  price  s  tab il  ity--namely
Price  uncertainty  does  not  distort  economic  decision  rnaking.  In  other
words,  while  our  definition  of  strong  price  stabiLlLy  imposes  long-run
restriccions  on  the  properties  on  the  price  level,  the  relevant  economic
tine  horizon  nay  not  be  infinity.
For  lhe  abowe  economlc  rnodel  and  monetary  policy  reaction  function,
price  level  uncertainty  at  an  arbitrary  tine  horizon,  k,  is  given  by
(24)  Var(pE+k -  .E  p.r*)  :
{A1 + Az(1-(d1-161)2(k-2))  + A'3(1-(d1-.t61)k-2)  + A4(k-2)  }var(eqt)
+  {81 + Br(1-(d1-I61)2(k-2)) + B3(1-(r1-r61)k-2)  + B4(k-2)  lvar(e..)
+  {c1 +  c2(l--(d1-161)2(k-2))  ) var(zt).
In  general,  Var(p.*p  -  .E p.*r)  is  a  nonlinear  function  of  the  money  reaction
function  paraneters  (see  appendix),  and  that  for  an  arbitrary  tine  horizon,
k,  strong  price  stability  does  not  necessarily  minirnize  this  variance.
However, under  strong  price  stability,  As:  Ao:  Bs:  B,,:0.  ELiminating
19these  terrns  is  particularly  useful  at  longer  time  horizons.  Furthermore,
Ao and  84  are  only  equal  to  zero  when  strong  price  stability  hol-ds.
Therefore,  while  strong  price  stabitity  is  not  sufficient  to  ninimlze  price
uncertalnty  at  shorter  time  horizons,  it  is  necessary  at  long  tine
horizons,  Note  thac  the  short-term  behawior  of  the  nroney reaction  function
as  captured  by  the  d",  do,  and  d6 paraneters,  which  are  not  constfained  by
strong  price  stability,  can  be  used  in  conjunctlon  r,ri  th  strong  price
stability  to  minimize  price  uncertainty  at  an  arbitrary  Elme  horizon.
The  fact  that  strong  price  stability  while  imposing  restrictions  on
the  long-run  conduct  of  monetary  policy  does  not  necessarily  imply  strong
restrictions  on  short-term  stabilization  policy  is  not  peculiar  to  the
above  economic  rnodel or  monetary  reaction  function,  Walsh  (L986),  who
examines  a  slightly  different  econornic  model  than  the  one  above,  considers
a  monetary  rule  thac  consists  of  a  monetary  target  (-),r)  and  stabilizatlon
term  {-y(qr -.-rE  q.)1.  In  his  model,  the  restrictions  implied  by  strong
price  stability  are  entirely  reflected  in  the  choice  of  monetary  target
(t.);  giwen  strong  price  stability,  the  opcimal  short  Tun  stabilization
parameter  1is  independent  of  the  monetary  target  (Walsh  L986,  p.  697).
In  conclusion,  strong  price  stability  does  not  necessarily  hamper  the
conduct  of  short-term  stabilization  policy  whether  the  goal  is  output
stabilization  or  minimizing  price  uncertainty.lT  Moreover,  strong  price
stability  is  useful  for  rninirnizing  price  uncertainty  ac  any  time  horizon
and  is  necessary  for  minimizing  uncertainty  at  long  time  horizons.  It
"  Seweral  studies  examine  the  transition  costs  of  moving  to  zero
inflation,  in  terms  of  lost  output  (e.g.,  Howitt  L990,  Aiyagari  1990).  These
studies  are  not  inconsistent  with  our  resuLts:  for  short  horizons  the  moneuary
authorities  still  face  a  poEential  tradeoff  of  minirnizing  price  level
uncertainty  or  rninimizing  output  variability.
z0seens that  while  strong  price  stability  inplies  restrictions  on long-rur.
nonetary  policy  stringent  enouth  to  rule  out  sone coruIlon  monetary  policies
(as  denonstrated  in  seclion  IV),  it  does not  necessarily  inply  strong
restrictions  on  short-term  nonetary  policy.  This  rnay leave  the  monetary
authority  enough flexibility  to  consider  short-tern  stabilization  policy
whiLe  still  achieving  stront  price  stabitity  in  the  long-run.
Dlscusslon  and  Conclusions
Achieving  sErong price  stability,  defined  as targeti-ng  of  the  long-run
price  level,  requires  strong  long-run  restrictions  on the  conduct of
nonetary  pollcy.  In  generaL,  the  money  supply  rnust follow  some  sort  of
feedback rule  that  offsets  the  nonstationarity  in  velocity  and/or  real  GNP.
Among  the  alternative  types  of  rnonetary policy  rules  considered,  price
Ievel  targeting  and nominal  cNP targering  (provided  the  nominal  GNP  target
adjusts  to  account  for  changes  in  trend  real  GNP) show the  most  promise  for
generatlng  strong  price  stability.  Sirnple money  supply  targeting  yields
strong  price  stability  in  fewer circumstances  than does targeting  either
the  price  1eve1 or  nominal  GNP,  Indeed,  the  current  nouetary  at'teP.ate
Procedures  that  include  target  cones  and base  drift  are  almost  guaranteed
!9!  to  result  in  strong price  stability.
In  contrast  to  stront  price  stability,  achieving  weak price  stability,
defined  as tarteting  the  inflaLion  rate,  imposes relatively  veak
restrictions  on Lhe conduct of  nonetary  poLicy.  In  fact,  attaining  I,/eak
price  stability  would not  necessarily  require  any changes in  the
stationarity  properties  of  the  monetary aggregates.  The relatively  weak
long-run  restrictions  on  the  nonetary  aggregates  associated  \rith  \,ieak price
2Istability  reflects  that  stochastic  price  leveL  shocks  need  not  be  reversed
under  this  pollcy.  This  lmplies  that  the  reduction  in  long-run  uncertainty
about  the  price  level  ls  rnuch smaller  under  weak  price  stability  than  under
strong  price  s  tab il  ity.
Advocates  of  strong  price  stability  aite  the  realuction  of  long-run
price  level  uncertainty  under  such  a  policy  as  the  main  reason  it  should  be
pursued.  Whlle  our  explicit  deflnltion  of  strong  prlce  stability  implles
rninirnizing  price  level  uncertainty  at  an  infinite  horizon,  there  are  close
connections  between  strong  price  stability  and  price  level  uncertainty  at
shorter  horizons  which  roay be  more  relevant  for  business  planning  horizons.
Specifically,  in  the  context  of  a  simple  linear  rationaL  expeclations
rnodel,  lhe  attairunent  of  strong  price  stability  heLps  to  mininize
uncertainty  at  shorter  tine  horizons  but  it  is  not  a  sufficient  condition.
For  longer  time  horizons,  scrong  price  sLability  is  a  necessary  condition
for  minimlzing  uncertainty.
Somewhat surprisingly,  the  attainment  of  strong  price  stability  does
not  preclude  the  monetary  authorities  frorn  pursuing  other  short-run
stabilization  objectives.  This  follovrs  from  the  fact  that  the  conditions
for  ptice  stabilicy  are  long-run  conditions  which  are  not  inconsistent  \{ith
most  short-run  behavior  of  the  monetary  aggregates.  This  result  does,
however,  raise  to  the  forefront  lssues  of  credibiliLy  and  optimality  which
this  paper  does  not  address.  Namely,  does  the  pursuit  of  short-run
stabilization  poLicies  damage the  credibiLity  of  the  authorities'  long-run
commitment  to  price  s  tab il  i ty?Appendlx
Solvine  for  the  equilibrium  price  level.
Starting  rvith  equation  (19),  taking  expectations  based  on  information
set  dated  t-1,  and  solving  the  resulting  difference  equation  for  expected
l,r ruEr  JrYrus.
(A1)  .-rE  p.  -  r=o>' (o1/(l-+o1) )i  t-rE[mt+r *  V't+L  -  ca(q*r*r+zr*r)  ]/(1+a1)  .
Using  (A1,)  we  can  obtain  .E  p.*1  and  substituting  for  .-1E  pt  and  tE  p.+r,  we
find  that  equillbrium  prices  are  given  by
(A2)  p.  :  (n.  +  v't  -  a3(q*r+zt)
+  ,=rt  (ar/(I+a1))r  1E[m.+r  *  V'.+i  -  03(q*t+i+zr+r) ]
+  ar/ (L+at) [.=oEo (arl(l+cr))t  .-rE(n.*,  *  v'.*r  -  a3(q*.*r+2.*r))  ))/(I+ar+d2r.
Note  that,  because  (ar/ (I+ar))  <  1,  the  order  of  integration  for  p.  is
deternined  by  the  order  of  integration  of  n.4  v't  -  o3(q*t+zr),
Civen  che  money  reaction  function  given  by  equation  (20),  equilibriurn
prices  can  be  solved  for  by  rnethod of  undeuernined  coefficients:
(21)  p.:60  +  6.n.  + 62eqt  +  6gg*.-r.  +  64eYt  +  6sv'r_1 +  662t.
where
6o:  o1d1(.\p*+0o)/(1,+ar6r\)  6  2: (-0r-0"6,0,+a1610 3+clr6,)  / (L*or*or*o16r.\ )
63 -  (-ca+o1610r)/(L+ar6r\)  6a:  (I-a26$  a+ar6rA  5+a$5),/ (  1+a1+a2+at61.\  )
5r  :  (1+ar6rdr)/(1+or5,I)  65 :  (-a3-a26-r0  6)  / (I+dr+a2+aL6r^)
o11612  +  (1+or(1-d1))61 -  L:0.
Using  the  conditions  (i)  and  (ii)  for  strong  price  stability  and  the
equations  for  6.  and  6,  yields:
d1.\6163  +  (1+ar(1--d1))6. + o,  :  0
0116165  +  (l+ar(l-d1)  )6s -  1*  0.
23Thus,  6,  -  -os6t  and  65 -  61.  From conditions  (i)  and  (ii),  this  yieLds
(i'  )  ,s -  ca(1--d1)  and  (ii'  )  ds -  -(1,-d1).
Effect  of  strong  price  stability  on  VAR(  ot_:_31t)
Suppose  the  nonetary  authorlly  wished  to  mlnlrnlze
(23)  var(q.-q*.)  :  Ic1(6r-6rd2)  ]zvar(eqt)  +  [cr(6a-61da)  ]zVar(e'.)
+  lct(66_6195)+1l2var(zt) .
Because  61,  63,  and  6,  are  lndependent  of  02,  0a,  and  d6,  it  is  possible  to
choose  d2,  d.,  and  d6 so  that  Var(q.-q*.)  :  0.
Whend2:0a-0u:0,
Var(q.-q*.)  :  Icr6r]2Var(eqt)  +  [c164]zvar(evr) +  [c165+1]zvar(zt) .
Under  strong  price  stabillty,
62 -  -a.(1+ot6!0rr/(L+a:do.z+o.6r.\),  6a -  (l+ar'r0r)/(1+o1+oz+ar51^),  and  c166+1
-  (1+ot+ct61l)/(1-+er+c"+or6rl).  By  setting  01 :  -L/a161  :  \/(L+a1),  then  6"  -
6r -  0.  Because 6r  in  this  case is  equal  to  -(l+a1)/(a1l),  then  c166+1  :0
as well,
Derivation  of  k-horlzon  forecast  variance.
From  equacion  (22)  and  after  some algebra,  we  obtain
p.*r  -  tE  p.*L -  [  6.  d  ,+6, ]  r=oEk-l (d1-61.\)ieqt+x-i
+  (-620r+610  3+5g)r=o!k-z (d1-61.\)req.*k-r-.
+  (6re3+63-630t)r_oX*-, (d1-drr)i(q*r*k_z_,  -  rE  9*.*r_z_i)
+  [  61d4+64  ]  r=oEk-1  (d1-61t) re't+k-!  +  (-64d1+61d5+6r)  r=oEk-2  (d1-6rl)  reo.*n-r-,
+  (61d5+65-65dr)r_oE*-.  (d1-61t)i(v,t+k-"-.  -  rEv'11L_2-r)
+  [61r6+65]  i=otk-l  (d1-611)  iz.*k_i  +  (-6511)i_0tk-2  (  r1-61r)rz.+k_1_!.
After  some algebra,  we  obtain
(24)  Var(p.rn  -  tE  pt+t)  :
24{A1 + A2(1-(d1-61),)2(k-2))  + A'3(1-(d1-61.\)k-1)  + A4(k-2)  }Var(eq.)
+  (81 + 82(1-(d1-6rr)2(k-2)) + B3(1-(d1-611)k-2)  + 84(k-2)  )var(evt)
+  (C1  +  C2(1-(01-61I)2{k-2)) 1 Var(zr),
where
Ar  :  |  6  a0  2+6  212 +  I (  6  ll 2+  6  )  (0 f  6  r^) - 6  20  !+6 r0  3+  6  12
A2 :  (  dr-6r),)2  x
[ (  61d2+62)  (  d  r-61.\  )  -52d1+61t  3+63-  (  61d  3+63-6  31  1)  / (  1- (  d  1-61r  ) ) 12/  G-U  f  6  L^)2)
A3 :  2(d1-61I) (61d3+63-63d1)  x
l(6J2+6)(01-6J>-620a+614j+63-(6rr3+63-630)/(L-(01-61r))l/(L-(dr-51I))2
Aa:  (  6rd,+6r-  6  30  r)2/  (L- (e  L-6  J))2
81 :  [6rdo+60]2  +  [(61d4+64)(d1-611)-64d1+6r05+6s]2
82 :  (  d1-6rr)  2 x
[ (  61d  4+64  ) (  d  1-61)  )  -54d1+6  J s+6  5-(6J  5+6  5-6  50  )  / (L- (0 f61r  ) ) ]2'l( L- (  d  r-61,\  )  2)
83 :  2(r1-611)  (61ds+6s-65r1)  x
| (  61d  4+64  ) (  d  x-61.\  )  -6 a  d  1+61d  5+65-  (  61rs+6s  -6 50  )  / (L- (0 r-61r  ) ) l,/  (  L- (  dr-6!r)  )2
Bo:  (  6.  d  5+65-  6  50  r)2  / (L- (e  L-  6  J)  )2
c1 :  I61d6+6612  +  [(61d6+66)  (0L-6r\>-66012
c2 :  (  d1-61.\)2  [  (61d6+66)  (  d1-61tr)  -66d1  ] 
2/( 1-  (  d1-61.\)  2)  .
Note  that  under  strong  price  stabiliry:
(6113+63-63d1)  -  (61d5+6s-6sd1)  :  0,
and,  hence,  As :  Ar *  83 -  84:0.References
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